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CHAPTER I
IN'!RODUCTION

The peculiar position of the Judiciary in the United
States is a source of wonderment and an occasion ot comment for Constitutional Law students the world over.
Alexis de Tocqueville claimed that the Judiciary was the
distinguishing note of American Democracy.

The reaaon tor

this statement and the essence of the distinction lies in
the tact that American judges founded their decisions on
the uonatitution and

not on mere laws.l

This implies

that a constitution is something above other laws, that
it baa a note of supremacy and that governmental activity
has its source and its legality from a conformity with the
Constitution.

Naturally someone or some

terpret the Constitution.

gr~up

has to in-

In this country, from its in-

fancy, this task fell to the courts.
to point out whether this or that

Their main job was

law conformed with the

Supreme Law ot the land embodied in the Constitution.
is quite different from the system in England.

For there

the Parliament is supreme and is the chief source of
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, A. A. Knopf,
New York, 1945, 1, 100
1

This

2

authority.
is law.

Its supremacy is unquesUoned and its word

When this principle of Parliamentary supremacy

was forced upon tne volonies

before the Revolution,

they bucked like fiery colts and in
the wrath of the English.

so doing brought down

For anyone who would not

accept so fundamental a British political principle was
no Britisher at all, but a rebel.

Instead of looking

to

Parliament, the Colonists looked to the charters and claimed
that these and the King were their source of authority and
guide in political action.

These charters stipulated the

powers the Colonial legislatures were to exercise and
preserved for posterity the written agreement between the
King and the Colonists.

It is a matter of history that the

Colonial legislatures were subject to Judicial review trom
the time of their settlement.

If a Colonial legislature

violated a charter provision, such a violation was declared unconstitutional

by the colonial courts.

These

judgments, in turn, could be appealed to the Privy Council
in England.

This august body had an auxiliary group

called the Committee on the Privy Council for Appeals,
whose function equivalated that of the Supreme Court today.
This body set the stage for

one of the most important con•

stitutional cases in American Constitutional History,
Marbury v. Madison, 1803, which shall be discussed at

3

length 1n this essay.

The constitutional charter o£

Connecticut, £or example, read that any law o£ its legislature "should not be contrary- to laws o£ England 11 .2
Connecticut, however, passed a law which stated that the
oldest son should receive a double portion o£ inheritance,
while all other children should receive an equal share.
This, of course, was quite at variance with the law of
primogeniture in England which insisted that the oldest
A Judge

son receive the entire share o£ the inheritance.

Winthrop died and his children shared his property according to the law o£ Connecticut.

But the oldest son was

not satisfied with the apportionment and took his complaint
to court.

His plea was rejected in the Courts o£ Connecti-

cut, where the case of Winthrop v. Lechmere_went down in
history in favor of the State o£ Connecticut.3

Winthrop

hastened to the Committee o£ the Privy Council on
Appeals, which body decided that the legislative act of
Connecticut on inheritance had violated the Connecticut
charter and therefore was unconstitutional.
With this judicial tradition, it is not surprising
2 B. J. Hendrick, Bulwark o£ the Republic,
and Co., Boston 1937, 95
3 ~., 95

Littl~Brown

4

to find that the framers of the constitution intended
that the courts should exercise final jurisdiction on the
constitutionality of legislative acts of Congress.

Four

outstanding authors of American Constitutional History,
quoted at length throughout this paper, show us more conclusivel~

bow many of the framers were of this precise

mentality.4

Professor Edward

c.

Corwin gives us a complete

resume of the attitude of the men of the Convention of
1787 on this subject.

He saysa

Nor can there be much doubt that the
members of the convention were also substantially agreed that the Supreme Court
was endowed with the further right to
pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of Congress. The available evidence
strictly contemporaneous with the
framing and ratification of the Constitution show us seventeen of the
fifty-five members of the Convention
asserting the existence of this prerogative in unmistakable terms and only
three using language that can be construed to the contrary. More striking
than that, however, is the fact that
these seventeen include fully three
fourths of the leaders of the Convention,
four of the five members of the Committee
of Detail which drafted the Constitution
and four of the five members of the
Committee of Style which gave the Constitution its final form.5
4 They include Albert Beveridge, Charles Beard, Professor
Edward S. Corwin and Charles Warren. Those who are
opposed include Louis Boudin, Chief Justice Walter Clark
and William Trickett.
5 E. s. Corwin, John Marshall and the Constitution, The
Chronicle of America Series, Yale University Preas, New
Haven, 1919, XVI, 11

5

To many students of American History, the change
in American governmental officials from the conservative
element of washington, James Wilson and John Adams, to
the liberal spirit of Jefferson, Madison,6 and Jackson,
has been an enigma.

There is a difficulty in understand-

ing how our way of life could continue more or leas the

same under the influence of men whose fundamental political
tenets were so different.

This study will attempt to

show that the unity of American life from 1787 to 1835
was mainly due to the conservative principles of the Federalist Party; more in particular, it will deal with the
man who was chiefly responsible tor building this spirit

ot national unity from the blueprints of the Constitution.
We will see how the Marbury Case, the McCulloch Case and
the Dartmouth College Case,. along with other related cases,
the living monument to the genius of John Marshall, Chief
Justice of the Supreme Cqurt from 1801 until 1835,

pre~

served the spirit of national unity throughout America.

6 Ibid., 12

CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL SETTING
OF MARSHALL'S THREE MOST IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
MARBURY V. MADISON
The year 1800 found two opposing forces striving
for leadership in the American government.
party was one force.

The Federalist

It controlled the reins through the

steady hands of John Adams, second President of the United
States, and John Marshall, Secretary of State and soon
to be appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The

Federalists favored a policy of strong national government,
as was evidenced by Adams• Alien and Sedition Acts.
Hamilton, too, from his writings 1n the Federalist, can
be categorized as an advocate of strong national government.

'!his party voiced its sentiments in the famous

Kentucky and Virginia Resolves written by
and James Madison respectively.

1~amas

Jefferson

These men were chiefs

of the opposition; they strongly advocated the right of
the

indiv~dual

state to interpret the constitutionality

of.Congressional acts.
When it became evident, after the elections of 1800,
6

7

that the Federalists had suffered a crushing defeat at the
polls, last minute preparations were made by the Federalists
to saddle the country w1 th a judiciary that favored a
strong central government. 1
The Federal court during this adolescent stage of
the Constitution was probably the most unpopular branch
of the Federal government.

The life tenure of the judges,

the presumption of the Courts to pass on the constitutionality of the law, and the arrogance of some of the federal
judges irritated the Republicans.

More than that, there

was real hostility to the courts as such.

The general

poverty, the poor markets, the want of a sound financial
system, the Republican sentiments of freedom and equality
of men, and the jealousy of the National Government that
bad seated Jefferson, made the whole machinery of the
courts hatetul to the dominant element in politics.

~here

had been unanimous dissatisfaction with the Judiciary Act
of 1789.

Some go so

far as to say it pleased only one

man, Ellsworth, the author of the bill.2

The Federalists

now prepared to nullity this act by proposing a bill of
their own.

~e

Supreme Court was no longer to go on cir-

1 J. E. Cotton, Jr. The Constitutional Decisions of John
Marshall, G. P. Putnam and Sons, New York, 1905, 1, 3
2 Beveridge, III, 53

8

cuit.

Six circuit

and twenty-two district courts were

established and new judgeships created.

On

February 27,

1801, a new act conferring forty-two justiceships for the
District of Columbia

~d

Alexandria was passed.

~~e

Senate

confirmed the appointment on March 3, and "on that night
the commission was signed by Adams and sealed by Marshall,
then Secretary of state and newly appointed Chief Justice.•3
But the commissions were not delivered.

Craigmyle says

that "by an inadvertence• they were not delivered.4
eridge is

Bev-

more explicit, and gives adequate proof that due

to Marshall's "customary negligence of details, he failed
to deliver the commissions

to the appointees.

he left them on his desk ••• "5
augurated, he
to issue

Instead • • •

When Jefferson was in-

directed Madison, as Secretary of State,

commissions to twenty-five of the persons

appointed by Adams, but to withhold the commissions from
the other seventeen.S

This action was held by all to be

erroneous, but still the President refused to comply.7
Among those whose commissions were withheld were
3 Ibid., 4
4 ~Craigmyle, John Marshall 1n Diplomacy and Law., c.
Scribner's Sons, New York, 1933, 113
5 A.J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, Houghton,
Mufflin Co., Boston, 1919, lll, 124
6 Ibid., 180
7 or;!gmyle, 113

9

William Marbury, Dennis Ramsey, Robert Townshend and
William Harper.

These four men applied to the Supreme

court for a writ of mandamus, compelling Madison to deliver their commissions.

The other thirteen did not join

in the suit, apparently considering the office of Justice
of the Peace too insignificant

to be worth the expense of

litigation. a
When the application of Marbury and his associates
came before Marshall, he assumed jurisdiction, and in
December, 1801, issued the usual rule to Madison, ordering
him to show cause at the next term of the Supreme Court
why the writ of mandamus Should not be awarded against
him.

Soon afterwards, Congress abolished the June session

of the Supreme Court.

When the Court again opened in Feb-

ruary, 1803, the ease of Marbury v. Madison was still pending.
Marshall was determined to make use of his seemingly
unimportant litigation to establish an essential power of
the Supreme court 1n the country, namely, to declare invalid acts of Congress that violate the Constitution.9
~e

unimportance of Marbury's commission is emphasized by

8 Beveridge III 160
9 Ibid., III

10
Craigmyle.

He claims that the issue between the litigants

•was only a trivial aff&ir".

Mr. Beveridge tells us that

so far as practical results were concerned, the case of
Marbury v. Madison was "of no consequence whatever to anyone".
It is to be noted that the aid of the Court was invoked on the ground that an act of Congress authorized
that Court "to issue writs of mandamus in cases warranted
by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed
by or persons holding office under the authority of the
United States•.lO
Two questions were involved in this ease, according
to the seeing eye of John Marshall.
the authority thus given

The first was whether

to the Supreme Court by the act

to issue writs of mandamus to public officers was warranted
by the Constitution.
first.

The second was a corollary of the

If the authority was not warranted, was the court

competent to declare void the act which undertook to eon•
fer the authority.ll
The decision of the case turned on the point whether
10 A. B. Magruder, John Marshall, Houghton, Mifflin and
Co., Boston, 1899, 181
11 ............
Ibid., 181

11
the Supreme Court had power to issue a writ, inasmuch as
the Constitution gave to the court no original jurisdiction
in such a case.

The Judiciary Act, in so far as it

attempted to increase the jurisdiction, conflicted with the
Constitution and was void.

The actual decision, then, was

against Marbury and

and restrained the qourt from

l~ted

exercising the power Congress had granted to it.

What

stung Jefferson and the Republicans however, was Marshall's
opinion on the illegality of the writ.

Jefferson considered

this •writ of mandamus" as an insult to the president and
the symbol of "judicial arrogance•.l2

Such a contrast

to anticipated procedure on the part of Marshall in declaring the writ void was a blow to the hopes of Jefferson.
For the leader of the Republican party and the choice of
the people had concocted a plan to eliminate undemocratic
Federalism entirely from the American government.

The in•

fluenee of the Nationalist leaders had been reduced to a
minimum by the will of the majority in both the executive
and legislative branch of the government.

The judicial

branch now was the only hope of men like Adams, Marshall
and James Wilson, who were using all their ingenuity to
preserve the spirit of the leaders of the Federal Con12 Hendrick, 182

12

vention in the new government of the United States.
Jefferson reasoned that since the majority indicated their
will in the elections of 1800, and since the essence of
democracy was in doing the will of the majority, was it
not inconsistent to have the spirit of the nation blocked
by the federal judges!

Jefferson had taken the first step

1n the process of elimination by refUsing to send the com-

missions to seventeen justices appointed by Adams.

After

that, he and the party were ready to take a slightly more
drastic step.

By a series of impeachments it was possible

to remove important Federalist judges and fill their shoes
by appointing judges of the Republican creed.

The process

started at the beginning of the Congressional session of
1803 when the House impeached John Pickering, Judge of the
United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire.

The spirit was catching, for the newly elected

Republican House in Pennsylvania impeached Judge Alexander
Allison.

Now Anti-federalists were setting their hearts

on the removal of samuel Chase from the bench.
Jefferson's reasoning regarding the Marbury Case
was logical.

Marshall naturally would decide the case in

favor of Marbury, so that as many Federal appointees might
hold office as was possible.

But his decision would boom-

erang, for in attempting to secure the reign of the Fed-

13

eralists in the judiciary_ Marshall would give grounds for
impeachment, lose the key position tor the Federalists,
and go down in ignominious judicial defeat.
Marshall was aware that he was liable to impeachment.
However there was something he teared even more than

~

peachment, and that was the man Jefferson would appoint 1n
his place, Roane of Virginia, a dyed 1n the wool Republican.
Without a doubt the principles of Federalism, to which he
was devoting his life, would give way to those of Republican
State Sovereignty.

Under this pressure Marshall conceived

the greatest Supreme Court solution in our history.

He

stunned Jefferson because in one sense, he solved the
ease in Jefferson's favor.
the writ of mandamus.

Jefferson complained about

This writ was the sign of judicial

arrogance - and Marshall in Marbury v. Madison denied
the power of the Supreme Court to use such a writ and
thus sided with Jefferson.

But herein lay the genius of

the solution because 1n admitting this point at the same
time he denied the power of Congress to confer such jurisdiction on the Supreme Court.

And in denying Congress•

power to confer such a jurisdiction, Marshall secured for
posterity the right of the supreme Court to pass on the
constitutionality of acts of Congress.

The tables were

14
completely overturned.

Jefferson had to scuttle his plans

while the Federalist flag waved victoriously in the wind.
McCULLOCH V• MARYLAND
The First Bank of the United States, designed by
Alexander Hamilton, functioned well during the first twelve
years of its existence.

It was managed according to high

banking standards, and contributed its share in maintaining
the national credit.l3

It served as a clearing house for

the government and, without cost, transacted all business
pertaining

to the funds of the government.

1~e

First

Bank of the United States did not yield to the temptation
of overspeculation but kept a
of its fUnctions and duties.

level head in the execution
But despite this rather en-

vious record, there arose an antagonistic attitude towards
this national corporation.

T.bis spirit was concomitant

with the coming of the Republicans to power.

Jefferson

insisted that the project was unconstitutional.

Madison

in the first Congress had opposed the bill to incorporate
the First Bank of the United States.

According to him,

Congress had no power to create corporations.l4

However,

as Mr. Beveridge remarks, the greatest objection to a
13 Beveridge, IV, 171
14 ~., 172

15
national bank was that it was a monopruy inconsistent with
tree 1nstitutions.l5
Jefferson voiced his opinion against the national
bank twelve years after its institution, and in the
third year of his presidency.

He said:

This institution is one of the most
deadly hostility~i~ existing against
principles and forms of our Constitution. An institution like this penetrating by its branches every part of
the Union, acting by command and in
phalanx, may in a critical moment,
upset the government ••• What an obstruction could not this Bank of the
U~ted States with
all i~s branch
banks, be in time of war?
The fact that two thirds of the Bank's stock was
owned in England did not add to its popularity with
Americans.l7

Unconstitutionality and "foreign ownership"

were pet phrases of the agents and friends of state banks.l8
The state banks, eager for the profits of the National Bank
and its branches, •chafed under the wise regulation of
their note issues ••• •l9

The Virginia State Bank, for ex-

ample, practically had a banking monopoly and was eager
to become the depository of national funds.20
.15 Ibid., 172
16 'Ibid., 172
17 ibid., 172 (ff.)
18 Ibid. , 172
~8 ~·~
173
a., 174

Besides,

16
Federalists were in charge of these National Banks and
their branches, while Republicans controlled the reins
of the government.

-

At the same time, the state banks had

control of the newspapers, and had successfully stirred
up considerable antagonism against their rival, the National
Bank.
On

the very threshold of the War of 1812, the National

Bank was voted down by a majority of one vote in the Senate
and House.

While foreign ships steamed out of New York

Harbor with large quantities of specie belonging to foreign
banks, restrictions on state banks were released.

Within

a short time, these same state banks abused their liberty
and were operating "with unrestrained license•.21
Two years of war without a National Bank forced the
administration to admit that if it were going to conduct
the war successfully, it had to have another Bank of the
United States.

But when it came to a concrete plan of

execution, the Republican administration was "stymied" •.
Then, when the war was over, Madison "timidly" suggested
that Congress set up another National Bank, in order that
the country might once more enjoy the benefits of a
21 Ibid., 176

17
"uniform currency".22
By 1816 the country found itself 1n a deplorable
financial condition.

The nation was flooded with a de•

based paper currency, issued by hundreds of banks which
were free from restraint as well as irresponsible.

The

nation was still prostrate because the war had disrupted
her commerce and curtailed her production.

As a result

the National Bank advocates had little trouble in incorporating a United States Bank to effect the resumption
of specie payments and to establish a stable paper currency.
But the economic disaster was not to be so easily remedied.
Specie payments were resumed and the volume of debased
currency lessened but the Bank was hated as badly as ever.
It was blamed for the increasing depression and hard times.23
On

April 10, 1816, the Second Bank of the United

states was chartered, but this ttme a majority of the
directors were Republicans.

ln that year there were 246

state banks, whereas in 1811, there were about 80 of
these banks, and only 3 in 1800.24

In 1816, 21 banks

were chartered in the thinly populated state of Ohio.
1818, 43 new banks were authorized in Kentucky.

22 Ibid., 180
23 cotton, 302
24 Beveridge, IV 178

All

!n

18
kinds of companies like "bridge companies, manufacturing
companies and mercantile companies" were authorized to
issue bills.

Private banks sprang up and did business

without any restraint.

"Nothing more was necessary to

start a banking busine.ss than plates, presses and paper". 25
Notes current in one part of the country were refused or
taken at a large discount 1n another.

Beveridge quotes

Niles to the effect that there were not "half a dozen
banks 1n the United States that are able to pay their
debts as they are payable".26

Beveridge quotes the same

authority as saying that in August, 1818 "the notes of at
least one hundred banks in the United States are counterfeited•.27
Into such a picture stepped the Second Bank of the
United States.

In the beginning it was guilty of many

blunders and of corruption; it over-issued and increased
inflation; it lavishly accomodated borrowers; 1n many
cases branch officers and directors issued notes as recklessly as did some of the state banks.28
Yet these branches did retuse to accept bills of
25 ~., 192
26 Ibi d ., 194
27
196
Ibid.,
28 ills!·, 197

19
notoriously unsound local banks, while they accumulated
an enormous amount of state bank bills.

They were well

disposed to extend unending indulgence to the state banks
and other borrowers, but they were finally compelled by
the parent bank to demand payment of loans and redemption
of bills of local banks which they held.

When the branch

banks carried out their orders, those sections of the
country paid most dearly where the excesses of state banking were most notorious, for in those sections the collection of debts came like the plague in the night.
On August 28, 1818, the branches were directed to
retuse all notes except their own.29

Thus the bank

"like an abandoned mother ••• bastardized its offspring",
said the critics of the National Bank, among whom could
be included all state banks and most of the people.30
The National Bank was reducing the currency while the
state banks and the people were clamoring for more currency.

Bankruptcy Showedits face on the horizon like a

dreaded disease.

Once more Mr. Beveridge quotes Niles:

"Never ••• have any ••• laws been more productive of crime
than the insolvent laws of Maryland".
29
Ibid., 199
30 Ibid., 201
............

One issue of the

20
Federal Gazette (Maryland) contained six columns of bankruptcy notices.31
In 1818 John Quincy Adams testified that:
OUr greatest real evil is the question
between debtor and creditor, into which
the banks have plunged us deeper than
would have been possible without them.
The bank debtors are everywhere so
numerous and powerful that they control the newspapers throughout the
Union and give the discussions a turn
extremely erroneous and prostrate every
principle of political economy.32

The states seemed to have one weapon against what many
people sincerely thought was their enemy.
ation.

That was tax-

T.hey would tax the Second Bank of the United

States out of existence.

The blows against sovereign

states should be warded off by weapons appropriate to
such states.33
Indiana's first Constitution prohibited any bank
chartered outside the state from doing business within
its borders.

Shortly after the National Bank opened its

doors in 1817, Maryland passed an act taxing the Baltimore
branch $15,000.00 annually.

Seven months later the

legislature of Tennessee enacted a law that any bank
31 Ibid., 201
32 Ibid., 205
33
207

Ibid.,
...........

21
chartered under its authority would pay $50,000.00 each
year for the privilege of banking in that state.

A month

later Georgia placed a special tax on the Second Bank of
the United States and so did Illinois, North Carolina,
Kentucky and Oh1o. 34

Such legislation seemed to forecast

the extinction of the Second Bank of the United States.
But laws and great documents, as well as great men, are the
fruit of crises, and this financial crisis was not an exception, for it produced the masterpiece of judicial decision known as the McCulloch v. Maryland Case.
The actual case of McCulloch v. Mariland arose out
of an attempt on the part of the State of Maryland to tax
the operations of the branch bank of the United States in
the city of

Balt~ore.

The State of Maryland in 1818

passed an act requiring all notes issued by banks not
operating by authority of the state to be issued on
stamped paper.35

If these requirements were not met, a

tax of $15,000.00 had to be

pa~.

The Baltimore Branch

Bank issued its notes on unstamped paper and at the same
time refused to recognize the authority of the State of

34 Ibid., 207

35 Cotton., 302

22
Maryland, by refusing to pay the $15,000.00 tax.

On May

8, 1818, James William McCulloch, the cashier of the
Baltimore Branch Bank was sued for the •recovery of the
penalties prescribed by the State of Maryland".36

The

case centered around the constitutionality of the act of
the State of Maryland as applied to the National Branch
Bank in Baltimore.

The case came directly before the

Supreme Court •on appeal•37 or on an •agreed case•.38
We shall examine the case more in detail on pages 43 to 47 and
72 to 78.
TRUSTEES OF DARTMOU'lli COLLEGE V. WOODWARD

On December 13, 1769, Eleazar Wheelock was granted
a charter for his school by John Wentworth, Royal Governor
of the Province of New Hampshire.

The charter established

Dartmouth College for the education of Indians to be governed by •one body corporate and politick" by the
Trustees of Dartmouth College.

The Trustees were given

a completely free hand in conducting the institution;
Wheelock was made President of the College and given power
to appoint his successor.

38 Beveridge, 283
37 Cotton, 302
38 Beveridge, IV, 224

The .charter stipulated that the

23

"trustees and their successors forever, or the major part
of any seven or more of them convened" were to make all
laws, rules and regulations for the College.

They were

also given the power to remove and choose a President of
the College and fill any vacancy on the Board of Trustees
occasioned by death, removal or any other cause.

Dartmouth

College was established and governed for nearly a half a
century under this charter.

In 1799, Eleazar Wheelock

died; he willed that John Wheelock, his son, should succeed
-as President.
In 1793, Nathaniel Niles, a lawyer, was elected one

of the Trustees.

He had studied theology under Dr. Joseph

Bellamy, who had engaged in bitter religious

contro~ersies

with the elder Wheelock, for Bellamy was a Congregationalist,
Wheelock a Presbyterian.

Niles and the younger Wheelock

inherited these religious differences from tutor and
parent.

Niles gradually acquired superior influence over

the Trustees and thereafter, no friend of President
Wheelock was elected to the Board.

Wheelock, perturbed

by the new turn of events, drew down upon himself the wrath
of the Board when he asked the state legislature to investigate the conduct of the College.
instinctively took

s~des

The people of the state

over this controversy regarding

the only college in their state.

Pamphlets were the means

24

chosen by both sides to express their feelings and to win
support.
cause.

Wheelock himself was the first to plead his
When another

p~phlet

appeared in favor of the

Wheelock taction, 1n quick order two appeared in favor of
the opposition.

These pamphlets naturally found their

way among the people and helped to bring the controversy
to a head.

On

August 26, 1815, the Trustees removed

Wheelock from office.

Reverend Francis Brown of Yarmouth,

Maine, was elected Wheelock's successor by the same Board
two days later.
The political parties soon found themselves on
opposing sides, the Federalists leaning to the side of the
Trustees, the Republicans to the side of Wheelock.

~hen,

with the election of William Plumer, an anti-federalist
to the governorship of New Hampshire, and the securing
of a majority 1n the legislature by the Republicans, a
new political turn occurred.

Governor Plumer, 1n his

message to the legislature said that he detected a
monarchical tinge in the charter of Dartmouth College,
which he thought hostile to free government.

Since Dart-

mouth College was founded for the public good, Plumer
argued that the state had every right to amend and improve
its charter.39
39

As a result of this message the legislature
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passed an act changing the nam.e of Dartmouth College to
Dartmouth University, increased the Trustees from 12 to
21, and created a Board of Overseers with veto power over
the acts of the Trustees.

When the old Trustees refused

to recognize these new provisions, the Governor and his
council of state set up a new university.
In the meantime two members of the old Trustees

went

to work drawing up a defense of their position.

These men, Thomas

w.

Thompson and Asa MacFarland by name,

really foreshadowed the work of Daniel Webster when they
based their argument on the fact that Dartmouth College
was the result of a contract between the State and the
twelve trustees.

This contract entitled the Trustees to

rights and privileges which the State was bound to respect.
The final step in the controversy and the beginning
of theDartmouth College Case, began when William H. Woodward, Secretary and Treasurer of Dartmouth College, who
had in his possession the original charter, the College
seal, and the record books, sided with the University.
The Trustees of the College sued him for what they claimed
was their property.

By mutual agreement between the

litigants, the case was taken to the Court of Appeals of
the State of New Hampshire.

Then the Dartmouth College
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Trustees, losing the case in the Superior Court of New
Hampshire, appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
states.40

The Superior

Court of Appeals had decided

against the College on the basis that a corporation whose
•tranchises are exercised for public purposes, is a
publick corporation" and that a gift to such a corporation
"is in reality a gift to the publick".
that the office of

The Court claimed

Trustee of Dartmouth College was as

much a public trust as the office of governor or judge.
Chief Justice Richardson, in delivering his opinion said
that it was against sound policy "to place great institutions of learning within the absolute control of a few
individuals and out of the control of the sovereign
power ••• •41
Immediately the case was taken

to the Supreme Court

of the United States by Writ of Error which assigned the
violation of the National Constitution by the College Acts
as the ground for appeal.
Hopkinson of Philadelphia

Daniel Webster and Joseph
argue~

the case for the College

Trustees, while John Holmes, a Representative in Congress
from Massachusetts, and William Wirt, Attorney-General
40 Haines, 391
41
Beveridge, IV 236
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of the United States, appeared for the University.
ease began on March

The

10, 1818.

Showing that Dartmouth College was an eleemosynary
corporation, Webster went as far back as the Magna Carta
to show the protection to which such a corporation was entitled.

He hit against the right of New Hampshire in

legislating against Dartmouth College, by asking the
questions

•What is the meaning of the words 'no state

shall pass any ••• law impairing the obligation of eontracts'"?42
Webster went on to show that Madison was on the side of the
College.

In the Federalist, Number 44, Madison clearly

stated that "such laws (impairing the obligation of contracts) are contrary

to the first principles of the social

compact, and to every sound principle of.legislation•.43
Madison went on to say that •our own experience has taught
'us ••• that additional fences should be built against
spoliations ot personal security and private rights".44
Further authority was the Supreme Court itself in the
Fletcher v. Peck Case when it

decl~red

that "a grant is a

contract, ••• and a grant by a state is also a contract, as

42 Ibid. , 245
43 H. c. Lodge, ed., The Federalist, G. P. Putnam's Sons,
New York, 1902, 279
44 llli· , 245
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much as the grant of an individual".45
At eleven o'clock on March 13, 1818,

the morning

after the argument was concluded, Marshall announced that
because of the indecision ot some of the judges, the case
had to be continued.

Finally, after a deliberation of

'

three days, the Chief Justice announced that the Court
had decided that the agreement between the State of New
Hampshire and the Trustees of Dartmouth College was a eontract "the obligation of which cannot be impaired without
violating the Constitution of the U:nited States". 46

45

Ibid.,
46 ~.,

246
272

CHAPTER III
THE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE DECISIONS
Charles Grove Haines in his recent book, The Role
of the Supreme Court in American Government and Politics
from 1789-1835, devotes a portion of his first chapter to
the process of judicial interpretation.

Since some of his

opinions laid down in this section are opposed to those
we shall try to demonstrate in this essay, it will help to
clarity our position by quoting from Mr. Haines.

The

keynote of Mr. Haines' theory regarding the process of judicial interpretation is found on the title page of the
book.

There he quotes Chief Justice Hughes as saying:

•we are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what
the Judges say it is•.

In giving his reader the meaning

of words in judicial decisions, Mr. Haines quotes Chief
Justice Holmes as sayingJ
A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of living
thought and may vary greatly in color
and content according to the circumstance and time in which it is used.l
Finally he gives us a set of opposing quotations, one from
Chief Justice Marshall and the other from Justice Cardozo.
1

Haines, 28.
29

30

Justice Cardozo denies the contention of Marshall that the
judge has no will in any case except the "will of the law",
when he observes that:
he (Marshall) gave to the Constitution
of the United States the impress of his
own mind; and the form of our constitutional law is what it is because he
moulded it while it was still plastic
and malleable in the fire of his own
intense convictians.2
Our duty is to go one step farther and to show that
Marshall's intense convictions were nothing more than the
spirit of the conservative element that was so influential
in the Federal Con.vention of 1787.

We shall try to show

that these two apparently opposing quotations are really
in agreement, for Marshall's intense convictions were the

same as the spirit of the predominating element of the convention and therefore the "will of the law".

And in place

of the conviction that the •constitution is what the
Judges say it is", we shall give evidence from John
Marshall's three cases treated in the first chapter, that
Marshall favored Justice Sutherland, who, when speaking
about the words of the Constitution, said; "Their meaning
is changeless; it is only their application which is ex-

2 Ibid., 39
3 Ibide

1

40
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Alexis de Tocqueville, keen student of American
governmental institutions, 1n his book, Democracy 1n
America, notes some characteristics of judicial power in
general.

One of them is the duty of arbitration.

"But",

he says, •rights must be contested 1n order to warrant the
interference of a tribunal. As long as a law is uncontested,
the judicial authority is not called upon to discuss it ••• n4
Chief Justice Marshall above all else, was a Federalist.
He lived that he might make operative the federal principles laid down 1n the Convention of 1787, reiterated
and developed in the Federalist Papers of Hamilton, and
echoed in the debates leading up to the Judiciary Act of
1802.

His mind was a practical one, and a patient one.

He must bide his time and wait for the psychological
opening to put into execution the fundamental tenets of
the Federalist party.

Since "as long as a law is un-

contested, the Judicial authority is not called on to discuss it", Marshall had to use every bit of intellectual
acumen to see in cases that came before his court, an
opportunity to advance his cause.5
However, before we look into the particular cases
that did so much to establish a national government in the

~ de Tocqueville, 99
Haines, 43
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united States, let us see what the political contestants
were fighting about during the

in~ancy

of our American

Republic.
G. K. Chesterton would have taken great delight in a
study of the principles of Federalism and Republicanism
during the formative years of American democracy, for he
relished paradoxes.

we are about to see how opposing

fundamental theories of government, postulated on the one
hand by Hamilton, James Wilson and John Marshall and on
the other by Jefferson, Randolph and Sherman, constitute
the body and
interested in

soul of our political heritage.
property

Hamilton,

rights and bent on safeguarding

minority claims, would eliminate the insecurity of the
minority by creating •a will in the community independent
of the $ajority".6

Safety, discipline, prosperity and

happiness would be part of our society, provided there
existed a system of laws, supreme in their nature, with
their source in the people, yet irresponsive to the
ephemeral and sometimes contradictory desires of the
people.

An aristocratic democracy, a government of all

the citizens, for all the citizens, by the most capable
of the citizens, was what the Federalist wanted for the
United states.
6 Haines, 197

We shall see how the Federalist champions
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pooled their

interests to stamp an indelible mark of

•national" in the spirit of our political tradition.
Hamilton's contribution to the Federalist stock Company
was a clear cut notion of the importance of fixed national
institutions in the preservation of a sound financial
system.
on

This conviction was embodied in his cabinet opinion

the establishment of a National Bank, a document which

caused President washington

to decide in favor of the

Bank, contrary to the suggestions of two other cabinet
members, Jefferson and Randolph. 7

Wilson~ interests in

the Company were represented by a masterful defense of the
"consolidated government• in the Pennsylvania State Convention, immediately following the Federal Convention, as
well as by public speeches, pamphlets, and lectures which
boosted the Federalist cause.

John Marshall, refusing to

gamble on the will of the majority because of the American
people's refUsal to pay their debts to England at the end
of the Revolutionary war, and because of the fear of
popular revolt due to Shay's Rebellion, cast his lot with
the Federalists and enhanced their cause by giving them the
greatest judicial mind the Supreme Court has ever had.s
An aristocratic democracy, but nevertheless a real

7 H. c. Lodge, ed., The works of Alexander Hamilton, G. P.
Putnam's Sons, Constitutional Edition, New York (no date)
III, 493
8 Corwin,
231
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democracy, was the preoccupation of the early Federalists.
All government had its source in the people, all government was executed for the people and by the people.

The

Constitution was the document, the instrument through which
the people declared their will in carrying the spirit of
democracy into practice.

This Constitution was the

supreme law of the land and lent stability to life.

In

order that it might remain a supreme law, and not subject
to the weaknesses of men, checks and balances and independence of departments were essential.

But government, if it

were to secure stability for society, must have the means
within its power to protect minority rights like property
rights and private contracts.

To insure such a vital

protection, which John Locke had said was the prime function
of government, a unique twist was given to the function of
the Judiciary.
the

protecto~

It was to

be the bulwark of our democracy,

of vested rights.

Like the "General Will•

of Rousseau, which forced the minority to be free by
forcing it to conform to the •General Will", the Judiciary,
by its complete independence and remoteness from the
people, came to their aid when disputes arose over their
interests and pointed the way to truth by a calm, deliberate and reasonable interpretation of their rights and
duties.

A perfectly impersonal and unbiased interpretation
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was necessary for stability, economic prosperity and community peace.

It is the genius of the American governmental

system that de Tocqueville says distinguishes American
democracy from other democracies.9

Based, as the

Jeffersonian Republicans claim, on the most undemocratic
of principles, the judicial right of interpreting the Constitution is the salient characteristic of the democracy
of democracies, the American democracy.
Jeffersonian Republicans, on the other hand, detested
the implication that the majority could not look after
its own interest.

Such a statement smacked of aristocracy

and monarchy according to them and should have no part in
American political life.

This group, although it had

its Hegel and Fichte in men like Jefferson and Madison,
lacked its Hitler

to carry its philosophic principles into

practical realities.
Randolph

tri~d

So Jefferson and Madison and

to play a double role.

They looked for a

bulwark against anti-republican tendencies in the state
governments.

In the state governments they saw a check

on the national power as well as a means to prevent undue
influence from a •monster• national government that would
9 de Tocqueville, 100
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override the rights of its master, the people, just like
Frankenstein did his own master.

Repulsive to the

Republicans was the disrespectful attitude toward the
majority, whose will, according.to Jefferson, was law.

He

was not interested so much in the stability of government
as he was in insuring the dominance.of the will of the
majority.

Such general phrases as, equal and exact justice

to all men, honest friendships with all nations, support
of state governments 1n all their rights, freedom of
religion and freedom of the press were the strongholds of
democracy.
In such generalities did the Jeffersonian Republicans

communicate their political message to the world.

But

while they shouted from the housetops.that faith in the
will of the majority was the salvation of democracy, the
well organized minority of Federalists went about carefully
securing the rights of minorities.

The inviolability of

contracts was made secure by the Dartmouth College Case;
a promise of a stable currency was looked for after the
McCUlloch Case.

The right of the states to interpret the

Constitution and to preserve the spirit of the Constitution,
a trump card in the hand of the Republicans, was defeated
by the Marbury v. Madison and Fletcher v. Peck cases.
Although the Republicans managed consistently to win

37

majorities in both the House and the senate, nevertheless
the Federalist chiefs quietly went about sowing the seeds
of a strong national government.

Of course, the American

public were not unaware to the situation.

They were

attracted by the high sounding phrases of the Republicans
and enjoyed the pat on the back regarding the integrity of
the majority, but they also knew that the boon to industry
and commerce after the Dartmouth College Case in 1819
did not flow from these same general principles.

American

democracy was fUnctioning for the interests of the majority
through those acts that secured the rights of minorities.
The paradox is brought into the open when we remember
that the Republicans had undisputed control of the executive
and legislative branches of the government,
on

and a majority

the Supreme Court Bench in the year 1819, yet the

McCUlloch case, decided unanimously by the Supreme Court
Judges, interpreted the case in conformity with the
spirit of Hamilton's Cabinet Letter to washington of February 23, 1791 on the doctrine of implied powers.lO

So,

while the Jeffersonians drank deeply of the spirit of the
French Revolution, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity and
fascinated the American citizens to the extent of paying
10 Lodge, III, 494
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dividends at the polls, the Conservatives gave vitality
to a more sober, more wise, more practical and more
efficient democracy by passing on to posterity a national
tradition of unity that proved its metal when tested in
the fire of the Civil War.
Now let us draw closer to the battlefield and watch
the thrusts and parries of the political swordsmen.

In 1802

the Federalists suffered a crushing blow when the Republicans, pushing through the Repeal Act of 1802, voted
against the supervisory power of the Judiciary over the
National Legislature.

The debates in Congress which pre-

ceded the Repeal Act were the warning signal for the momentary
end of the Federal principle of judicial supremacy.
Jefferson and his party were out to stifle the new
Judiciary Act of 1801 and to render ineffective the swan
song of the Federalist's champion, President Adams.

The

point at issue, and the target at which the Repeal Act was
aimed, was the power of the Supreme Court
of Congress.

to annul acts .

With this . s~bling block out of

the way,

America would be a real democracy, and the flag of Republicanism, so becoming to the dignity of man, would wave
victoriously in the wind.

Once again the two parties were

drawing swords in anticipation of a later day when swords
of steel would replace the sharp thrusts of words.

However,
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this Repeal Act did more than sink the enemy ship, for
it laid the foundation for the Marbury decision, which
turned the seeming Republican victory into unexpected defeat.

There were few arguments in the Marbury case that

were not used on the floor of Congress by the Federalists
in their uphill battle to save Federalist principles.

As

Beveridge notes, all the reasons Marshall gave one year
later in the Marbury Case were given during the fight over
the Judiciary Act of 1801.11
On

January 6, 1802, Senator John Breckenridge,

capable exponent of Republican democracy, voiced a
fundamentaltenet of Jefferson's constitutional creed,
when he said that the Legislature, as far as law making
power is concerned, have exclusive right, while the
Judges have an obligation to carry out the laws they make.
But Gouverneur Morris, a member of
challenged such a statement.

the Federal Convention,

Re remarked that according

to Republican doctrine, •the moment the Legislature •••
declare themselves supreme, they become so ••• and the constitution is whatever they choose to make it".l2
James H. Bayard, who won the award for most skillful
11 Beveridge, III, 75.
12 Ibid., 71.
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swordsman for the losers, said in a prophetic tones
"Destroy the independence of the National Judiciary and
the moment is not far when this fair country is to be
desolated by Civil War.•l3
John Randolph of Roanoke, one of the three full time
members of the Federal convention of 1787 who did not sign
the Constitution, led the House in quashing the Federalist
judicial principle.l4

He argued that •the proper restraint

of the'"legislature was not found in a pretended power of
the Judiciary to veto legislation, but in the people themselves, who a.t the ballot box could apply the constitutional
corrective•.l5

This, he claimed as a •true check".

Every

other one was at variance with the principle that a tree
people are capable of self-government.

In general, the

sentiments of the Republicans in the debate, though sometimes not quite so forceful, may be summed up in the
words of Jefferson

in a letter to Mr. Jarvis, on September

28, 1820, when he wrote that "to consider the judges as
the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions •••
would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy".l6
13 Ibid., 82
14 At this time the House was Republican two to one, while
the Senate had a Republican majority (ct. Beveridge,
III, 72.)
15 Ibid., 85
16 Ibid. , 144
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The upshot or the debate was a repeal or the Judiciary
ACt or 1801.

But the dereat was a blessing in disguise

ror it made Marshall see the exigency or establishing
rirmly in our political tradition the right or the Supreme
court to pass on the Constitutionality of Congressional
acts, and in

so doing provoked his ramous decision in the

Marbury v. Madison case of 1803.

Marshall had issued a

writ of mandamus to Madison in 1801, demanding that the
secretary of State give reason why Marbury did not receive
his commission.

But the Repeal Act of 1802 abolished the

August term of the Supreme Court, so it was not until
February, 1803 that the case finally came

to the Court.

This power of issuing the writ of mandamus was a power
given to the Supreme Court, not by the Constitution, but
by Congress itself, in section 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.

In this section Congress gave to the Supreme Court

the power to issue the writ of mandamus "to any courts
appointed or persons holding office under the authority
of the United States ••• •l7

When Marshall issued the writ

in 1801 there is no evidence that he intended
the power of

~1e

to dispute

Supreme Court to issue such a writ.

Only

the force of the Repeal Act of 1802 seems to account for
17 Cotton, I, 38.
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the apparent change in procedure on the part of Marshall.l8
Now, in 1803, the case took on a new aspect.

It

was a golden opportunity, for here was a case that claimed
its jurisdiction from a Congressional act.

Yet by what

power did Congress pass on such a jurisdiction?

It was in

this decision of Marshall's that he judged the incompetency
of Congress

to confer such a power and thus established

the principle that the Supreme Court had the

power to

pass on the constitutionality of acts of Congress, for
•it is the very essence of Judicial duty ••• to determine
if a law be in opposition to the Constitution."l9
After the elections of 1800, the influence of the
Federalist party in national politics waxed and waned
until the war of 1812, when its influence was reduced to
the barest minimum.

But despite the fact that the Repub-

licans controlled both the executive and legislative branches
of the government, Marshall was molding the minds of the
interpreters of the Constitution along Federalist lines.
In 1819, when the McCulloch v. Maryland Case came up,

there were five Republican-appointed Judges on the Supreme
Court Bench.

Despite the fact that the case brought up

18 Beveridge, III, 133.
19 Cotton, I, 39
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the issue of Federalism versus State Sovereignty, all
five Republican justices concurred with Marshall in rendering a unanimous decision in favor of the Federalist
interpretation of the Constitution.20
Adhering to the spirit of the Kentucki Resolves,
which in no way reflected the spirit of the leaders of the
Federal Convention of 1787, the defenders of the state of
Maryland insisted that the Constitution flowed from the
acts of sovereign and individual states• and received its
power fro.m the states and not from the people.

Marshall,

ever on the watch for despoilers of the tradition of 1787,
used the case as an instrument for projecting Federalist
doctrine into the practical tradition of our government.
"The government of the Union", said Marshall, "is emphatically and truly a government of the people.
and substance it emanates from them.

In

form

Its powers are granted

by them and are exercised directly on them and for their
benefit."21
But more to the point was the doctrine of implied
powers versus the Jeffersonian •strict interpretation"
principle.

Marshall was ready to admit that the powers of

the government were •enumerated". And, of course, the dif20 Haines, 354.
21 Cotton; I, 312.
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ficulty that arose and that "will probably continue to
arise as long as our system shall exist" was the "extent
of those powers actually granted.n22

But at least a

principle could be laid down that would shed some light on
the solution of the problem.

"The government of the Union,

though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere
of action." 23
It is true that the power to create a National Bank
was not expressly granted to Congress by the Constitution,
but was it not according to the spirit of the Constitution
to argue that "a government entrusted.with such ample powers,
on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity
of the Nation so vitally depends, must also be entrusted
with ample means for their execution?•24

For "the power

being given, it is the interest of the Nation to facilitate
its execution.

It can never be their interest and cannot

be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarass its execution by withholding the most appropriate
means.•25

This principle

is reiterated and re-echoed by

Marshall throughout his decision.
words he says againa

~~Ibid., 313.
Ibid., 315
25 Ibid., 315

Even in more forceful
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let the end be legit~ate, let it
be within the scope of the Constitution and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited but consistent with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.26
So far we have noted a planned exposition of the meaning of the implied powers of our government, which might
have been a part of any treatment on the significance of
the United States government.

Marshall meets the

~dvocates

of the state of Maryland head on, however, when he speaks
of an implied prohibition of powers relating to state governmentsc
the states have no power, by taxation
or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or
1n any manner control, the operations of
the constitutional laws enacted by
Congress to carry into execution the
powers vested 1n the federal government.
This we think the unavoidable consequence
of that supre~cy which the Constitution
has declared.

In the same year, 1819, we find Chief Justice :Marshall
deciding another of his most famous Constitutional cases,
Dartmouth College v. woodward.

Although it is one Of his

most famous decisions, as far as practical, political
26 Ibid., 329.
2 7 Ibid. , 344.
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economic effects are concerned, the constitutional principles set down, for the most part, have appeared in the
two cases already reviewed.

In 1803, in Madison v. Marbury,

the Chief Justice established the right of the Judiciary
to pass on the constitutionality of legislative acts.

In

the Dartmouth case he confirms that principle by denying
the validity of the legislative act of the State of New
Hampshire when it meddled with the Dartmouth College
"contract•.

Marshall held that the Dartmouth College

charter was a "corporate franchise" and a "corporate
franchise is a contract and so inviolable and beyond the
control of the state."
It was the Federalist principle that the Supreme
court was the defender of the rights of the people,
through its protection of the private contract and the
private corporation, that encouraged the businessman to
undertake private enterprises without fear of governmental interference and that had such widespread economic
effects. 2 8
28

Going back to the Constitution itself, Marshall

w. F. Dodd, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law,
west Publishing Co.; st. Paul, Minn., 1941, 1234. Mr.
Dodd says that "although the Dartmouth College Case dealt
primarily with the charters of eleemosynary corporations,
it has been uniformly accepted since as applicable to
the charters of all kinds of business corporations ••• ",
1234.

~----------------------.
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notes

tbat~he

American people have said in the Consti•

tution that 'no state shall pass ••• any law impairing the
obligation of contracts•".29

He quotes the same document

to the effect "that the Judicial power shall extend to
cases in law and equity arising under the constitution•.30
Thus we have seen that Marshall was a Supreme Court
Justice of the Federalist mold.

He decided his cases on

definite objective principles defined and cl&rified by
the speculative intellects of Wilson and Hamilton and
proved pure gold in the fire of practical experience.

It

was not changing. spur-of-the-moment. subjective principles
that Marshall applied to the Marbury, McCulloch and
Dartmouth college cases.

His philosophy and political

principles did not change according to the "circumstances
and tLme"• but rather they were changeless principles,
changeless in their essence because they were based on
man's true nature, the same today as yesterday and
tomorrow.

29 Cotton., I. 352.
30 ~., 353

CHAPTER IV
THE THREAD OF FEDERALISM IN MARSHALL'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS.
He~i

Bergson, noted modern French philosopher,

claimed that every great philosopher has one great intuition, through which he penetrates the mysteries of
intellectual knowledge.

This great intuition is the

foundation stone, the anchor, the alpha and omega of all
truth for him.

~~ery

other bit of reality gushes forth

from the fountain of· this one truth and loses its identity
in the stream of that

one reality.

St. Thomas Aquinas

saw all truth in the light of being, and whether we examine
his doctrine on Act and Potency or the Nature of Relations
or Free Will, we shall always be able to hark back to the
fountain head, "being", and discover a consistency of WhiCh
few philosophers can boast.
But this ability to see things through one idea is
not limited

to the field of philosophy.

Alexander the

Great centered his life around the conquering of the world,
Napoleon ambitioned France and Napoleon as the rulers of
Europe and perhaps the world.

Hitler was convinced of

the superiority of the German Race and viewed all other
races as the handmaids of his people.

John Marshall saw

the people of the United States as a great empire, but only
48
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in so far as the people were united under one strong
national or central government.!

':L'his government must be

free from the petty jealousies or subordinated state governments and had to be able to act for the

good or the

whole nation, even if that action might be irksome to some.
Reasonable principles or rights and duties did not motivate
men when personal advantages came into play,

un~ess

hard

and fast rules whose sanction was never to be doubted were
laid down by well-founded authority.

People needed

threats to make them toe the mark, if greed and personal
advantage were not going

to dethrone justice.

That is

why a central government must dominate the United States,
for states as well as people can be selfish.

This fact

was obvious from the quarrels of Virginia and Maryland
over the navigation of the Potomac, and from the advantage
that New York and Pennsylvania took over New Jersey before
the Federal convention of 1787.

Such action based on

personal gain spelt disunion, strife and war.

It would

make North America the happy hunting ground for older and
better schooled foreign states.

The stone·that would

kill two birds, that would make for an unselfish relationship at home and a united front abroad, was a well-regulated,
l Beveridge, I, 302
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well-respected, strong and efficient central or national
government.
The means by which such a government was established
are a living tribute to the Constitution, the Founding
Fathers and the genius of Marshall, the-Chief Justice.
During the period of his chief-justiceship, from 1801
until his death in 1835, Marshall delivered 519 opinions
in the field of general law and 36 in the field of constitutional law.

These 36 constitutional law cases are like

a strong rope made of 36 robust strands giving valiant
support to an otherwise tottering national government.
Master weaver that he was, Marshall wove the strands
amidst the clamor of the opposition, reminding us of the
scarlet Pimpernel! of French Revolution fame, who calmly
watched the guillotining of the

Fren~h

Aristocracy dis-

guised as a peasant woman, yet all the while with great
courage and skill, he plotted the rescue of his fellow
aristocrats.
The first strand of tightly-knit rope that has
weathered political storms for nearly one hundred and·
fifty years was the Marbury Case, which succeeded in
establishing the fact that the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land and secondly, that constitutional
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interpretation ultimately rests with the Supreme Court.
This latter point was not a new idea, as Charles Warren
points out in his book, Congress, The Supreme Court and
the Constitution. 2

He gives conclusive evidence that

many of the leaders of the Federal Convention were of this
conviction.

But the Marbury Case established in practice

the Supreme Court's right to pass on the constitutionality
of a coordinate national branch, the Legislature.

Con-

firming the Marbury Case was the Fletcher v. Peck Case
wherein Marshall, in 1810, judged that the Supreme Court
also had final authority when it came to a showdown between
a state legislature and the Supreme Court 1n matters constitutional.
Two working principles, then, were the practical
fruit of the Marbury and Fletcher v. Peck cases; that the
Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the Judiciary has the final decision in declaring whether the laws
of a state of the nation are unconstitutional.
principles gave birth to a

healt~offspring

These

endowed with

integrity, rather than a possible temJ:erarrental child that
would yield to the impulse of the moment.
In 1821, additional support was given to that already

2 C. Warren, Congress, the Constitution and the Supreme
Court, Little, Brown and co., Boston, 1925, 69 and 70.

52

robust principle of Judicial power in the case of Cohens
v. Virginia.

We note from this case that •the Judicial

power of every well constituted gover.nment ••• must be
capable of deciding every judicial question which grows
out of the Constitution and laws•.3

This is so, for "the

constitution and laws of a state, as far as they are repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States
are absolutely void".4
The Republicans were forced to accept the Marbury
Case, and the principle on which the Fletcher·v. Peck
Case was founded.

At least they had

to acknowledge that

the Constitution was the supreme law of the land.

How-

ever, they also had a theory on how to make this supreme
law of the land as ineffective and inoperative as possible.
One way was to establish the states as the interpreters
of this supreme law, which the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves explicitly intended to do.

But this plan was upset

by the three cases just cited.
The Republicans, however, fought hard tor their
convictions and were as bent on undermining Federalism
as Marshall was in building it up.
strong with a principle, which, if
3 Cotton, I, 412.
4 Ibid., 442

So they came back
success~

would tie the
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neatly woven strands of Ma.rshall' s constitutional eases
in knots and render them useless.

That principle was the

"strict interpretation" of the Constitution leaving the
door open to state supremacy.
they

cla~med,

The National Government,

had only those powers which the states had

explicitly given it; all others were retained by the state
governments.

The Federal Government had no power, for ex-

ample, to establish a National Bank, because this power
was not given explicitly by the Constitution.

To set one

up, then, was a usurpation of power, a stepping beyond the
bounds of their rights.

We have seen how Marshall made

Hamilton's doctrine of implied powers live in the McCulloch
case; yet he was ever on the alert to back up a great case
and to prolong its spirit by bringing it back to life in
new forms.

In the Gibbons v. Ogden Case {1824), he re-

minded us of the hierarchy of political values.
acts of New York must yield

" ••• the

to the law of Congress; and

the decision sustaining the privilege they confer, against
a right given by a law of the union, must be erroneous."
Marshall knew that the integrity of a government depended
on the proper subordination of inferior governments, and
consequently he never tired of pointing out the proper re5

~.,II,
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lationship between the federal and the state governments:
The nullity of any act, inconsistent
with the constitution, is produced by
the declaration that the constitution
is the supreme law. The appropriate
application of that part of the clause
which confers the same supremacy on
laws and treaties, is to such acts of
the state legislatures as do not
transcend their powers, but, though
enacted in the execution of acknowledged
state powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the law of Congress, made in
pursuance of the constitution, or some
treaty made under the authority of the
United States. In every such case,
the act of Congress, or the treaty is
supreme; and the law of the state,
though enacted in the exercise of p~wers
not controverted, must yield to it.
In this same case Marshall singles out the power of
Congress to create a bank for the purpose of carrying on
fiscal operations as a particular example of their general
power to create corporations as "appropriate means of executing the powers of government".

Long before the Chief

Justice bad the opportunity to announce the doctrine of
the Federalists on implied powers in a big issue like
McCulloch v. Maryland, he evidenced his attitude on the
subject in United States v. Fisher et al. in 1808, "Congress
6

~.,II,
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must possess the choice of means and must be empowered to
use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise
of a power granted by the constitution".?
part and parcel of the Nationalist tenets was the insistence on the inviolability of contracts.

The most

famous case that had such great commercial significance
was the Dartmouth College Case, already discussed in this
paper.

Marshall must have had the page that contained the

words "No State ••• shall pass any Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts"8 thumb worn.

He was convinced

that the integrity of vested rights was a most fundamental
principle of government and society, and that the preservation of such right• was an essential function of government.

He was aware that providing adequate safeguards

for property and contracts against state legislatures was
if not the most important, one of the most important
tasks of the framers of the Constitution.9

It was

Madison's conviction that interference with this sacred
right of property was more influential than anything else
in producing the convention of 1787.10

So naturally he

was on the alert to discover in a case possibilities for
7 Ibid., I, 45
8 A;ticle I, Section 10, American Constitution
9 Corwin, 147.
10 .!2!!!.·, 148.
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for establishing the integrity of vested rights and 1n
the Fletcher v. Peck Case, in 1810, such conditions presented themselves.

The state legislature of Georgia, in

1785, had authorized the sale of 35 million acres of disputed territory for $500,000.00 to four companies known as
the Yazoo companies.

With one exception, every man who

signed the bill obtained rights in the granted land.

In

1796 the Legislature rescinded its previous act, pronouncing
it null and void.
same

In 1802 the claims ot Georgia over this

controversial territory were recognized and the

land was no longer under dispute.

A settlement was made

and commissioners were appointed by Congress to settle the
conflicting claims.

Those of the Yazoo Companies were

not even recognized.

But the Yazoo organization, the

majority of whose members came from New England, was not
to be denied of what it claimed was its right.

In 1809

and 1810 the case came before the Supreme Court on a Writ
of Error from the circuit court for the District of
Massachusetts. 11
Professor Corwin tells us that Marshall could easily
have disposed of the case before coming to the principal
question.
11

Among other outlets was the fact that the fraud

Cotton, I, 228-231.
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connected with the grant was notorious, the "most resounding scandal of the generation 11 .1 2

Yet Marshall

closed his eyes to the facts because they were rivoted
on a possible constitutional issue involving the principle
of vested rights.

The dispute, as Marshall saw it, came

to whether Georgia had the power to rescind a land grant
made by a preceding legislature.

Such a rescinding act

was a violation of vested rights which in its broader aspects
violated a fUndamental principle of society.

The Chief·

Justice stretched the issue of the obligation of contracts and

applied it to this case.

For in a grant, he

stated, there is an implied contract, to wit, the grantor
implies by his grant that he doesnot intend to reassert
his right to the thing granted. 13 More clearly in the
following words he dismissed all doubt in the question:
"When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when
absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal
of the law cannot divest those rights•.l4
Although the Sturges v. Crowninshield Case, delivered
at the same time as the McCulloch v. Maryland, and the
Dartmouth College Case, is sometimes referred to as

12

Corwin, 152
l3 Ibid. , 153.
14Cotton, I, 244.
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"dangerous ambiguity", 15

Marshall is definite when speak-

ing of the obligation of contracts.

He says that the

•convention appears to have intended to establish a

~eat

principle, that contracts should be inviolable".l6
Again in New Jersey v. Wilson, Marshall declares the
sanctity of contract.

New Jersey had granted a portion of

land in South Jersey to an
taxation.

Indian tribe, exempt from all

When the Indians decided to move to New York in

1800 to join "their brethern at Stockbridge", they applied
for and obtained an act of the legislature authorizing
the sale of their land.

The land was sold in 1803 without

anything being said about the taxation clause.

Then in

1804 the Legislature of New Jersey repealed that clause
which exempted the land from taxes.

The highest court of

that state had justified the procedure of the legislature,
but when the case was broughtbefore Marshall on a writ of
Error, he reversed the decision, claiming that New Jersey
could have insisted on a surrender of the tax provision as
the sole condition on which-a sale of the property should
be allowed--but she did not.

Therefore, New Jersey impaired

the contract and was in error.
We have seen in
I~ Corwin, 190

Cotton, I, 297

this chapter how four fundamental

59

conservative principles constituted the background for all
the important constitutional decisions of John Marshall.
T.he right of private contract, the Judicial right to
interpret the Constitution and to pass on acts of Congress,
and the precedence of the Constitution as the Supreme Law
of the land were championed in theory by the leading conservative element in the Federal Convention of 1787, and
were projected by Marshall into the warp and woof of
routine American life.

The same principles which character-

ized the Federalist Fathers in 1787, through the instrumentality of the Supreme Court Cases were now made the living
tradition of a unified nation.

The American Union, whose

blood was beginning to thin in 1802 due to an overdose of
political liberalism was gradually restored to its pristine
purity by a series of planned Supreme Court decisions based
upon these fundamental tenets of the Conservative Party.
These decisions made our governmental eystem pulse again
with the beat of national unity, even though it was robed
in the gaudy garments of the Liberals.
Burton J. Hendrick, in his book, Bulwark of the
Republic, a biography of the Constitution, wonders if the
task of forging the Constitution was not a lesser task
than making the Constitution acceptable to the individual
state conventions and the people.

For instance, in New

60

York two-thirds of the Convention and four-sevenths of
the people, according to Hamilton, were opposed to accepting the new constitution.l7

We shall show in the next

chapter how writings, like the Federalist Papers, during
this momentous period of our history, along with the
speeches in the conventions of New York, Virginia and
Pennsylvania which were an elucidation of the minds of
the leading members of the Federal Convention, were the
chief source of material for Marshall's great decisions.
Thus, an unbreakable chain, whose links were the Federal
Convention, the documents in defense of the Constitution
immediately after the close of the Federal Convention,
and the Constitutional decisions of Chief JUstice Marshall,
secured for the ages to come the political integrity of
the United States.

17 Hendrick, 98

CHAPTER V
THE MAIN SOURCES FOR MARSHALL'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS
To appreciate more £ully how per£ectly Marshall
grasped the spirit of the leaders of the Federal Convention
o£ 1787, let us consider more in detail the writings o£
the men who were most influential in forming the Constitution and shaping the political thought o£ the Chie£ Justice.
For behind John Marshall's constitutional

decisions were

great political principles for which he claimed no
originality.

He achieved the heighbof greatness in his

own £ield, but that field was not the origins o£ £undamental
political principles.

Rather, his claim to fame was his

uncanny faculty to use constitutional cases as a stepping
stone to a greater national union, to apply sound political
principles at the psychological moment, when their
establishment was in dire need and seemed almost impossible.
So, £or a clearer understanding of these political convictions, which caused Marshall to exercise such patience
and courage in raising an almost lifeless in£ant to a
healthy and sound manhood, let us see how the minds of
James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton helped to £orm and
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strengthen the Chief Justice's political principles.
The task is not an easy one, for Marshall very rarely
cited authority in his cases.

Mr. Andrews, in his •works

of James Wilson", notes that Marshall's greatest opinions
are founded on the arguments of council before him, but he
seldom stops to say "it was held" or "as council argued".l
John Marshall would give an approving nod to the study of
his source material.

He was only too willing to disclaim

any originality regarding purposes or tenets of the Federalist party.

Professor Corwin tells us that Marshall

did not originate the purposes of the Constitution:
••• and no one would have been quicker than
himself to disown praise implying anything
different. He was thoroughly persuaded
that he knew the intentions of the framers
of the Constitution ••• and he was equally
determin~d that these intentions should
prevail.
Which of the framers did Marshall call upon to help
him decide his constitutional cases?

That he knocked on

Hamilton's door we know, for Mr. Hamilton is one of the
few authorities the Chief Justice cited as a reference.
quoted directly from the Federalist, Which Cotton in his
introduction to The Constitutional Decisions of John
1 J. DeW. Andrews, I, 549
2
Corwin, 122

He
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Marshall, says was the "first authoritative interpretation
of the Constitution and was mainly written by the two prin•
cipal authors of that instrument".3

In the case of

Weston v. Charleston, referring to the Federalist, Marshall
used the words "thi's high authorityn.4

Again in McCulloch

v. Maryland, he r.eferred to the same Federalist as "those
excellent essays•. 5

Another of Hamilton's writings that

profoundly influenced the judgments of Marshall was his
Cabinet opinion, written in 1791, on the Constitutionality.
of a National Bank.

We shall also make reference to the

speeches of James Wilson in both the Federal Convention of
1787, his defense of the Constitution in the Pennsylvania
State Convention

~ediately

following the Federal Convention,

and his speech in 1785 in defense of the right of Congress
to incorporate a National Bank.

In these documents we

are going to track down those four principles which we have
already shown to be the fundamental principles upon which
the cases in this essay were decided, as well as the backbone of the Federalist party.

These principles include

the conviction that the source of

all government authority

rests with the people; that there are implied powers in the
3 cotton, I, xliii.
~ Cotton, II, 273.
Ibid., I, 343

-

He has reference to Hamilton and Madison.
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Constitution and therefore the Constitution must be
interpreted6 and interpreted liberally 6 that the judiciary
has the right to pass on the constitutionality of acts of
Congress, and finally that the right of private contract
is inviolable.
First we shall consider the works of James Wilson,
Scotch born American, lawyer, lecturer, signer of the
Declaration of Independence, and one time Justice of the
Supreme Court, who was one of the most influential speakers
of the Federal Convention.6

No matter what speech you

consult in the Convention of 1787, you will find Mr.
Wilson interjecting somewhere his sentiments about the
people as the source of all authority.
point

~

He harped onthis

nauseam, as if he had some great fear that6 should

this fundamental political idea not become part of America's
new government, all the work of the Convention would be in
vain.

Again in his defense of the Constitution in the

Pennsylvania State Convention of 1787, Wilson expressed
his mind on the importance of estaolishing the United
States government on the people as the source of all
authority;

"the supreme powers therefore should be

vested in the people is in my judgment, the great panacea
6 M. Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of
11§1 1 Yale University Press, New Haven, 1911, III, 91
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of human politics". 7. He realized that governmental powers
must be considered and cautiously divided, but he insisted
that the principle from which these powers flowed must be
understood properly, if the Assembly was going to consider
the new Constitution intelligently.

Because the Constitu-

tion, that "great and comprehensive plan", conferred
"streams of powertt, it was important to be able to "trace
them all to one great and noble source, the people".8
It was Wilson's idea, that the government of the United
States was a government of the people .of the United
States, and not a government of the states, as Jefferson
intended.

In order that this nation might function

responsibility must hit every citizen directly, and not
through the medium of a state government.

For this reason,

in Mr. Wilson's plan the state government assumed a subordinate position, whereas in Jefferson's scheme the individual state was independent of the Federal Gavernment.9

On December 19, 1787, still defending the new Constitution in the Pennsylvania State Convention, Wilson
revealed a certain fear of tyranny and license.

However,

7 Ibid., 142
J. B. McMaster and F. D. Stone, eds., Pennsylvania and
the Federal Constitution, 1787-1788, Inquirer Printing
and Pub. Co., Lancaster, Pa., 1888, 331.
9 McMaster, 231.

8-
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by conferring adequate powers on a national government,
this fear would vanish, so he. reasoned.

This, of course,

did not mean that the people lost anything by giving these
adequate powers to the government, because sovereignty
resided wi.th the people who only "let out" those powers
considered necessary for the common good.

after all it is

the "power of the people" that "is the great foundation of
the proposed system.nlO

For the very existence of the

new system "depends upon the supreme authority of the people
alone." 11

The sage diagnostician had placed his finger

on the soft spot in our government's weakness during the
days of the Confederation.

"The people have been hitherto

shut out of the federal government but it is not meant
that they should any longer be dispossessed of their
rights.nl2
On July 24, 1788, Mr. Davie, defending the Consti-

tution before the North Carolina Assembly, substantiated
Mr. Wilson's position on the importance of the •we the
people's" part in the formation of the Constitution:
The confederation derived its sole
support from the state legislature.
10 Ibid., 356
11 Ibid., 302
12 Ibid., 302
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This rendered it weak and ineffective.
It was therefore necessary that the
foundations of this government should
be laid in the broad basis of the
people.l3
Not only as a lawyer and political statesman did
Wilson reiterate this principle of the sovereignty of
the people, but later on as Supreme Court JUdge, under
Washington's appointment, he insisted on the importance of
the principle.

In the Chisholm v. Georgia Case of 1793, he

recalled the principle when he said:

"Government belongs

to the people of the United statesn.l4
washington had great admiration for the intellectual
talents of

J~es

Wilson.

Perhaps it was while our first

President heard his opinions on the position of the
legislature, behind the closed doors of the Federal Convention of 1787, or while reading his speeches in defense
of the Constitution at the Pennsylvania State Convention,
that made Washington think Wilson would serve his country
well as a Supreme Court Judge.

For in the Convention,

Wilson eXpressed in so many words the principle that decided the Marbury Case.

"I say", began Wilson, "that

under this Constitution the legislature may be restrained
1 3 Farrand, 111 , 340
1 4 Andrews, xvi
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and kept within its prescribed bounds by the interposition
of the JUdicial Department.nl5

In the same speech the

question of the legitimacy of acts of Congress came up.
Wilson met the question with a principle that runs through
Marshall's decisions.

It is precisely this statement that

de Tocqueville says characterizes American democracy&
But when it (an act of Congress) comes
to be discussed before the Judges, when
they consider its principles and find·
it incompatible with the superior
powers of the constitution; it is their
duty to pronounce it void; and judges
independent and not obliged to look
to every session for a continuance of
their salaries will behave with intrepedity and refuse to the act the
sanction of judicial authority.l6
To show that Mr. Wilson was not only revealing the
position of the leaders of the Convention on this question,
but stating the tradition in American Constitutional experience, we quote Mr. Gerry, speaking in the Federal
Convention of 1787.

He mentioned that it was customary

in some states, from their earliest days to set aside
laws because they were in opposition to the state constitution or charter. 17

This was not considered any

usurpation for it was ftdone with the greatest approbationn.l8
15 McMaster, 304
16 Ibid., 304
17
Introduction, iii
18 Farrand, 1, 97

g;;-
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We have already indicated that political conservatism
summed up the spirit of Marshall and the Federalist party.
Yet it is to Mr. Wilson that we turn for tne most living,
compact and most original exposition of that spirit.

The

document that we shall examine is Mr. Wilson's defense of
the power of Congress to incorporate a National Bank.

His

speech was provoked by an act of the Pennsylvania Legislature which repealed a former act throwing open its doors
to the Bank.

The famous Philadelphia lawyer denied the

legitimacy of this act of repeal on the part of the
Pennsylvania Legislature.

He argued that laws of different

kinds that involve incorporation, rights and properties,
do not imply the same discretionary power to repeal.
this division of hi,s argument, Mr. Wilson reflects the
whole spirit of the Conservative party:
In a law respecting the rights and

properties of all citizens of a
state, this power may be safely executed by the Legislature. Why?
Because in this case the interest
of those who make the law (the
members of the assembly and their
constituents) is the same. It is
a common cause and may be safely trusted
to the representatives of the community.
Nor can one hurt ,another without at the
same time hurting himself. Very different is the case with regard to a
law by which the state grants privileges to a congregation or society.
Here two parties are instituted and
two distinct interests exist. Rules

In
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o£ justice, of faith and of honor must
there£ore be established between them,
for if interest alone is viewed, the
congregation or society must always
be at the mercy of the community•••
For these reasons and whenever the
objects and makers o£ an instrument
passed under the £orm of a law, are
not the same, it is to be considered
as a compact, and to be interpreted
accordLng to the rules and maxims
by which such compacts are governed.l9
We quote this speech at length in order to bring out
the very essence o£ Conservative doctrine which was a thorn
in the side o£ Je££erson, and the most £undamental reason
£or the decided split among men Who pro£essed to be citizens of the same country.

Wilson takes great pains to

show how a common cause between the state and the citizens can be "sa£ely trusted", £or "none can hurt another
without at the same time hurting himsel£".

But on the

other hand, when two distinct interests con£lict "rules
o£ justice, faith and honor must be established between
them".

This kind of spirit put the damper on democracy,

smacked o£ monarchism, smothered human liberty and had
to be scratched from the annals o£ American History,
thought the Liberals.

Yet this was the spirit Marshall

was looking £or; this was the side Marshall wanted to
£ight on, because it was the very pruning kni£e that was
going to bring about a full blossoming American nation.
19 Andrews, 567
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John Marshall knew that if this country were to rise above
petty state jealousies, this political doctrine of Mr.
Wilson must permeate her statutes.
To conclude Mr. Wilson's contribution to the decisions
of John Marshall, we quote once more from the National
Bank speech of 1785, regarding acts of incorporation which
is the best single quotation that reveals the core of the
Federalist spirit:
••• To receive the legislative stamp of
stability and permanency, acts of incorporation are applied for from the
legislature. If these acts are repealed
without notice, without accusation, without hearing, without proof, without forfeiture, where is the stamp of their
stability. Their motto should be Levity.
If the act for incorporating the subscribers to the Bank of North America
shall be repealed in this manner, a
precedent will be established for repealing in the same manner every other
legislative charter 1n Pennsylvania.
A pretense as specious as any that can
be alleged on this occasion, will never
be wanting on any further occasion.
Those acts of the state, which have
hitherto been considered as the sure
means of privilege and of property,
will become the sport of every gust of
politics, and will float wildly backwards and forwards on the irregular and
impetuous tides of a party and faction ••• 2o
Next to James Wilson, Marshall was especially
guided by the writings of Alexander Hamilton.

2o Andrews, 567

One of the
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most important cases in American Constitutional History
is the case of McCulloch v. Maryland.
cided on the principle of

L~plied

was the first one to advocate.21
Cabinet Opinion, addressed to

This case was de-

powers which Hamilton
It appeared in his

W~shington

in 1791, on

the constitutionality of a National Bank.

The President

had already received the opinions of Mr. Jefferson, his
Secretary of State, and Mr. Randolph, his Attorney
General, on the matter.

Both had denied the power of

Congress to create such a corporation.

Washington sent

both arguments to Hamilton so that he might put down the
positive arguments as clearly as possible.

It was Hamilton's

rebuttal of the Liberal party's position that caused
Washington to approve of the Bank. 2 2
Washington had a foretaste of the future battles
between the Federalist and Republican parties when in
1791 he read the letters of Hamilton, Jefferson and
Randolph on the constitutionality of a National Bank.
If he had lived to hear the case of McCulloch v. Maryland
his mind would have flashed back to the correspondence of
1791 when he was the judge of whether the strict or the
21 A. c. Lodge, 111, 493.
22 ~., 493
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broad interpretation was more consistent with the spirit
of the Constitution.

And now in 1819, Marshall carried

on the tradition of both Hamilton and washington in his
decision, first by expounding the implied powers theory
after the model of Hamilton's cabinet Opinion, and then
by judging as WaShington did, in favor of the implied
power theory.
Hamilton, one time student at King's College, showed
that he had absorbed the substance of scholastic philosophy,
the backbone of the curricula, not only at King's College,
but at all the colleges and universities during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centunes in this country.23
The oft repeated philosophic dictum medium

~

finem was

the general principle employed by Hamilton in discoursing
on the implied powers of the Constitution.

The question

at issue was the power of Congress to form a corporation.
This question fell under the broad aspect of proper relationship of means to an end.

Does the corporation to

be erected have a "natural relation" to any "objects or
lawful ends" of the government.

Since the government has

"sovereign power to regulate a thing", it has the right
23 J. J. Walsh, Education of the Founding Fathers of the
Republic, Fordham University Press, New York, 1935, ix
and 184.
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to rremploy all the means which relate to its regulation to
the best and greatest advantagen.24
John Marshall based his argument for the legality
of a National Bank on precisely this same fUndamental
philosophic argument.

He remarked that it was a matter of

human prudence and in conformity with the spirit of the
framers of the Constitution that Congress in order that it
might be able to execute its great powers expeditely,
should have any means at its disposal which might be
appropriate and conducive to the end.

To favor the

opposite interpretation that Congress's powers were to be
executed according to a strict legal code would be to
change entirely the character of that instrument.25
Jefferson argued from the elastic clause of the Constitution which reads:

"The Congress shall have power to

make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all
other powers vested by the Constitution in the Government
of the United States or in any Department or Officer
thereof", 26 against the establishment of a bank and
claimed the National Bank was neither necessary nor proper.
24 Lodge, 111, 450
25 Cotton, I, 314
26 Article It section 8, Last paragraph of the Constitution
of the un1ted States of America.
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No means were necessary, Jefferson contended, but those
"without which the grant of the power would be nugatoryn.27
Such an argument from Jefferson's pen caused Hamilton to
go into a discussion of the significance of the word necessary.

Arguing against such a restrictive use of the

word necessary, Hamilton claimed that neither the grammatical
nor the common use of the word justified such an interpretation.

According to both these criteria, "necessary"

often meant no more than "needful, requisite, incidental,
useful or conducive to".

He insisted, too, that the

entire 'elastic clause' indicated that it was the intention
of the framers of the Constitution to give "a liberal
latitude to the exercise of specific powers•.28

Hamilton's

quill must have moved at a faster clip when he retorted:
To understand the word as the secretary
of State does would be to depart from
its obvious and popular sense, and to
give it a restrictive operation, an
idea never before entertained. It would
be to give it the same force as if the
word absolutely or indispensably had
been prefixed to it.29
Marshall again modeled his argument after Hamilton's
Cabinet Opinion when he took up the significance of the
27 Lodge, III, 452
2 8 Ibid., 453

29-

~.,

453
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word "necessary" in the McCulloch v. Maryland Case.
His cri.teria for correct usage were "the common affairs
~

of the world" and "approved authors".

According to these

criteria we discover the word 'necessary' frequently
"imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or
useful or essential to another".30

In the general accepted

use of the term, to use the means necessary to an end is
understood as "employing any means calculated to produce
that end and not as being confined to those single means,
without which the end would be entirely unattainable".31
Hamilton wrote in 1791 of the •great latitude of
discretion" that a government needed in selecting and
applying means to an end.

By this he showed that he was

not sitting in an ivory tower, for a government must be
able to act, and act efficiently, if it is going to serve
the common good.

Marshall revealed the same practical

spirit by insisting on the importance of a legislature's
need to "avail itself of experience, to exercise its reasons
and to accommodate its legisl~tion to circumstance.s".32
Many other
30 Cot t on, I, 321
31 Ibid., 321
32Ibid., 323

kindred~assages

could be -cited to show
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Marshall's thorough familiarity with Hamilton's Cabinet
Opinion and its profound influence in such a case as
McCulloch v. Maryland. For example, look at the striking
similarity in Hamilton's criteria of what is constitutional
in his Cabinet Opinion, and Marshall's criteria in McCulloch
v. Maryland.

Hamilton, writing about the doctrine of im-

plied powers claimed that the criterion of constitutionality is "the end to which the measure relates as a means".
He goes on to say:
If the end be clearly comprehended
without any of the specified powers,
and if the measure have an obvious
relation to that end, and is not
forbidden by any particular provision
of the Constitution, it may safely
be deemed to come within the compass
of national authority.33
Whereas Marshall says in the McCulloch v. Maryland:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the Constitution
and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consistent

;~~~ti~~ti~~t=~ea~~n=~~~!~i~!ai~g4
It has already been mentioned that Hamilton through
the Federalist influenced the judgment of Marshall.
33 Lodge, III, 458
34
Cotton, I, 329

In

78
the Federalist, number 78, the one time Secretary of the
Treasury, attempted to clarify the spirit of the Federal Convention on the position of the Judiciary in our
national government.

He wrote that the "interpretation of

the laws is the proper and peculiar providence of the
courts• and must be regarded by the Judges as a fundamental
law 11 • 35 Just as Jefferson visioned the states as the bulwark of democracy, Hamilton envisioned the courts of justice
as the •bulwark of a li~ited constitution against legislative
encroaehments.• 36 caught by this sound political spirit
of Hamilton which fitted in so perfectly with his ow.n
personal experience with human nature, Marshall adopted
these principles and made them the basis of his constitutiona! decisions.

35 H. c. Lodge, The Federalist, 485
36
Ibid., 487

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
There were many elements during the first fifty
years of our nation's life that entered into making the
American States a United States.

The first and greatest

of all was the Constitution itself, a political masterpiece, a compromise of wants and needs that showed posterity
that more than anything else the framers of the Constitution wanted a Union.

Big states and small states, agri-

cultural states and non-agricultural states, states with
navigable rivers and states without navigable rivers, slave
states and non-slave states, after four months of heated
debate, finally agreed to live as one nation, according to
the provisions of the Constitution.

This was triumph

number one in the evolution of the great American nation.
Not to be overlooked however were the succeeding steps
that led to practical political unity in this country.
The battle to ratify this written document was almost
as hard fought a victory as its framing.

The clarification

of ideas through the Federalist, the courageous and undaunted exposition of constitutional concepts in the
State Conventions of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts
79
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and New York, by men like James Madison, James Wilson and
Alexander Hamilton overcame almost insurmountable odds
and opposition. 1
Yet the job was only beginning when the ninth state
ratified the Constitution.

The valiant defenders who

opposed "consolidated government" and backed a loose
confederated government along the lines of the Articles
of Confederation were not to undergo a sudden change of
heart.

This group, the backbone of the Republicans,

picked up power when the nation was but a babe in arms.
Jefferson and Randolph and Breckenridge, master politicians
and leaders, had plans to substitute their own child for
the

i~fant

of the Constitution, before the very eyes of

its guardian and protector, the Federalist party.
It was John Marshall who rallied to the defense of
the Federalists when he thwarted the plans of the
Jeffersonians by incorporating the fundamental tenets
of the Federalists into the legal tradition of the Courts,
the •bulwark of democracy".

That he knew the spirit of

the Federalists has been shown by his own constitutional
decisions and the writings of the leaders of the Federal
1

Beveridge, 1, 323 and Hendrick, 96-99
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Convention of 1787.

'f.hat he loved the principles of the

Federalists has been brought out by the dangers of impeachment he faced in deciding the Marbury Case, and the
abuse and criticism he knew he would have to accept in the
Dartmouth College and Fletcher v. Peck decisions.
Because of his understanding, and faith in the tenets
of Federalist doctrine, because he was convinced·of the
salutary nature of their philosophy as far as the life of
the American Nation was concerned, John Marshall exercised
the greatest courage and judicial statesmanship in fostering our country from infancy through adolescence up to
wholesome manhood.

Referring to this judicial statesman-

ship, Professor Corwin concludes his scholarly treatment of
the Chief Justice's part in Constitutional History with
the following encomium:
••• he formulated, more tellingly than
anyone else and for a people whose
thought was permeated with legalism,
the principles on which the integrity
and ordered growth of their nation
have depended. Springing from the
twin rootage of Magna Carta and the
Declaration of Independence, his
judicial statesmanship finds no
parallel in the salient features of
its ach~evement outside our own
annals.

2 Corwin, 231
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